Optimal Assignment of Durable Objects to Successive Agents by Bloch, Francis & Houy, Nicolas
Optimal Assignment of Durable Objects to Successive
Agents
Francis Bloch, Nicolas Houy
To cite this version:
Francis Bloch, Nicolas Houy. Optimal Assignment of Durable Objects to Successive Agents.
cahier de recherche 2009-45. 2009. <hal-00435385>
HAL Id: hal-00435385
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00435385
Submitted on 24 Nov 2009
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
  
OPTIMAL ASSIGNMENT OF DURABLE OBJECTS TO 
SUCCESSIVE AGENTS 
 
 
 
 
Francis BLOCH 
Nicolas HOUY 
 
 
 
 
 
July 2009 
 
Cahier n° 2009-45 
 
 
 
                              ECOLE POLYTECHNIQUE                      
CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE 
 
 
DEPARTEMENT D'ECONOMIE 
Route de Saclay 
91128 PALAISEAU CEDEX 
(33) 1 69333033 
http://www.enseignement.polytechnique.fr/economie/  
mailto:chantal.poujouly@polytechnique.edu 
 
 
Optimal Assignment of Durable Objects to Successive
Agents∗
Francis Bloch† Nicolas Houy ‡
July 31, 2009
Abstract
This paper analyzes the assignment of durable objects to successive generations of
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agents and is determined by a selectivity function which satisfies an iterative func-
tional differential equation. More patient social planners are more selective, as are
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1 Introduction
This paper considers durable objects which are successively reassigned to agents.
The prime example of objects which are regularly reassigned are positions in or-
ganizations and bureaucracies, like executive offices or diplomatic postings. Other
examples include offices, rooms in dormitories, computer servers, large scale scien-
tific equipment like telescopes and particle accelerators, hotel rooms and rental cars.
In all these examples, agents are given temporary property rights over the durable
object for a given period, and cannot be forced to return the object. These tempo-
rary property rights create a constraint on the optimal assignment policy chosen by
a benevolent social planner, and our objective in this paper is to characterize the
efficient dynamic assignment of a durable object to successive generations of players
taking into account these individual rationality constraints.
We consider environments where overlapping generations of agents enter the mar-
ket deterministically, and agents are assigned the object for their entire lifetime.
Agents differ in their valuations for the objects, or their qualifications for the po-
sitions. Agents characteristics are thus two-dimensional and include a type which
determines the value of the assignment, and an age which determines the length of the
assignment. Our objective in this paper is to characterize optimal assignment rules
in this two-dimensional model, and construct revelation mechanisms when agents’
types are privately known.
The basic trade-off between age and value is best understood in a two-period
overlapping generations model. When assigning the good to an old or young agent,
the social planner makes the following computation. Assigning the good to the old
agent for one period has a positive option value, as the good can be reassigned at the
end of the period ; assigning the good to the young agent for two periods prevents
the planner from reassigning the good immediately. Hence, if the old and good
agents were of the same type, it would always be optimal to assign the good to the
old agent.1 This line of reasoning shows that, for any type θ of the young agent,
the planner will prefer to give to the any old agent of type greater or equal to φ(θ),
where φ(θ) < θ.
The main contribution of the paper is to characterize the selectivity function,
φ(θ), which is adopted in the optimal assignment policy. This function is defined by
an iterative functional differential equation, which is similar to the equations used
in physics and mathematics to study dynamical systems with state-dependent delay
1The option value of giving a position to an older agent is a well documented historical fact.
For example, the history of the papacy records a number of elections where cardinals voluntarily
chose the oldest candidate. Oftentimes, these ”transition popes” turn out to be the most energetic
and effective popes of their times. See Collins (2009) and his account of the reign of two famous
”transition popes”, John XXII (1316-1334) and John XXIII (1958-1965).
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(Eder 1984). While we cannot provide an analytical solution to the functional differ-
ential equation, we prove existence and uniqueness of the optimal assignment policy
and show that the selectivity function is increasing and concave. We illustrate the
optimal assignment policies for uniform and quadratic type distributions, and derive
comparative statics properties of the solution. Under some regularity conditions, we
show that when the discount factor increases, or when the distribution of types is
shifted so that higher types have a higher probability, the social planner becomes
more selective, and assigns the object to the young agent less often.
In the second part of the paper, we consider different extensions of the model.
First, we analyze the optimal assignment policy when monetary transfers are allowed
and agents can be compensated when they return the object. If there is no recovery
cost, the optimal assignment policy is identical to the first-best policy without indi-
vidual rationality constraints: the object is assigned at every period to the agent with
the highest value. If an old agent who currently holds the object has a smaller value
than the young agent, the young agent can easily transfer money in return for the
object and the individual rationality constraint ceases to be binding. With positive
recovery costs, the optimal assignment strategy becomes more complex, and involves
two different selectivity functions, one which is used at periods where no agent holds
the object, and one which is used when the old agent holds property rights over the
object and needs to be compensated. We characterize the optimal assignment poli-
cies as solutions to systems of differential functional equations, both with fixed and
proportional recovery costs. We also illustrate these complex assignment strategies
for the uniform distribution.
In a second extension of the model, we analyze direct revelation mechanisms
when the types of the agents are privately known. Given the time structure of the
assignment rule, we can build different revelation mechanisms. In the first model, we
suppose that agents are asked to reveal their types when they enter society as young
agents, whether the object is reassigned or not. In the second model, we assume that
agents are only asked to reveal their types (and pay a transfer) at periods where the
good is reassigned. For both models, we use standard arguments to characterize
transfer rules implementing the optimal assignment policy. Not surprisingly, these
transfer rules involve a step function, where transfers jump to a flat positive value
when the agent’s type reaches the threshold value for which the good is assigned to
her.
Finally, we investigate the agents’ incentives to invest in order to improve their
types between the two periods of their lives. We characterize the optimal investment
and assignment strategies of the social planner as solutions to a system of simultane-
ous differential equations. We show that agents’ optimal investment is higher when
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they are sure to retain the object, and illustrate the optimal investment strategy for
a uniform distribution of types and a quadratic investment cost function.
Axiomatic characterizations of assignment rules for durable goods have recently
been proposed by Kurino (2008) and Bloch and Cantala (2008). Kurino (2008)
considers a dynamic extension of Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez (1999)’s study of house
allocation with existing tenants – the first example of an assignment problem with
individual rationality constraints –, and analyzes whether the rules proposed in the
static paper still satisfy efficiency and incentive compatibility in the dynamic context.
Bloch and Cantala (2008) consider a model where agents are assigned to different,
vertically related objects, and characterize Markovian assignment rules which satisfy
myopic efficiency and fairness. By contrast, in this paper, we consider a simpler
model where agents only live two periods and can only be assigned one good. In this
simpler model, we are able to characterize dynamically efficient rules, and to discuss
the incentive properties of transfer rules.
This paper is also related to the rapidly growing literature on dynamic mecha-
nism design. Parkes and Singh (2003), Athey and Segal (2007), Bergemann and
Valima¨ki (2006) and Gershkov and Moldovanu (2008a, 2008b, 2008c) study dy-
namic assignment problems, where agents enter sequentially, and participate in a
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves revelation mechanism which determines transfers and good
allocations. They show that Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms and optimal stop-
ping rules can be combined to obtain efficient dynamic mechanisms. In these mod-
els, objects can only be assigned once at the time of entry. Some of these studies
(like Gershkov and Moldovanu (2008b, 2008c)) distinguish between benevolent and
revenue-maximizing planners. When agents’ types are known, the literature on yield
management in management science and operations research (see Talluri and Van
Rysin (2004)) provides an in-depth study of optimal pricing strategies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the model in Section
2. We analyze efficient assignment policies in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to the
three extensions of the model and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Agents
We consider the assignment of a single durable object to overlapping generations of
agents. Time is discrete and runs as t = 1, 2, ...∞. At each period t, one new agent
enters society. Agents live for two periods, so that at each period, society consists
exactly of one young and one old agent. All agents share the same discount factor
δ ∈ (0, 1).
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Agents are characterized by their type θ which measures the flow of utility gen-
erated by the assignment of the object. We suppose that types are drawn before
an agent enters society and last for the agents’ entire lifetime. Types of successive
agents are drawn independently from the same distribution F , which is assumed to
be non-atomic, have full support on a compact interval Θ = [θ, θ] ⊂ <+ and admit
a continuous density function f . We assume that types are always positive, so that
all assignments create positive surplus.2 At any time t, we denote by θyt and θ
o
t the
types of the young and old agents. The model starts at period 0, where the type of
the old agent, θo0 is given and known to everyone.
The object will be successively assigned to agents present in society. We suppose
that agents cannot be forced to relinquish the object. In other words, we assume
that when the object is assigned to a young agent, the young agent keeps it for two
periods. This assumption introduces a strong asymmetry between old and young
agents. It implies that, at some periods, the object will not be reassigned. We can
thus distinguish between two sets of dates: a set T0 of periods at which the object
is not reassigned because the young agent retains it for another period, and a set of
dates T1 at which the object is reassigned. This is illustrated in the following graph:
Figure 1: Overlapping generations and assignments
In this example, there are three dates at which the object is assigned, dates
2This assumption is made without loss of generality. If some types were negative, we could as
well consider a distribution where these types form an atom at zero (which would not affect our
analysis), as the good will never be assigned to them.
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t = 0, 1, 3. At date t = 2, the object is not assigned. The object is assigned to the
old agent at periods t = 0, 3 and to the young agent at t = 1.
In the baseline model, we suppose that transfers to agents are not allowed, and
that the planner only chooses to whom the object is assigned at any date t ∈ T1.
Formally, the planner’s control variables are the probabilities pot and p
y
t with which
the object is assigned to the old and young agent. The utility flow for a young and
old agent at date t ∈ T1 are given by
Uyt = p
y
t θ
y
t ,
Uot = p
o
tθ
o
t
and at a date t ∈ T0 by
Uyt = 0,
Uot = θ
o
t .
2.2 Social planner
We assume that the social planner has an infinite horizon and evaluates sequences
of payoffs using the same discount factor δ as the agents. At each period t ∈ T1, the
social planner chooses a probability pair (pyt , p
o
t ). These choices generate a stochas-
tic process over the sequences of assignments (θ0, ...., θt, ...) and we assume that the
benevolent social planner chooses the probability pair in order to maximize the dis-
counted sum of utilities resulting from the assignment:
V =
∞∑
t=1
δtE[θt],
While the social planner can in principle condition his choice {(pyt , pot ), } at pe-
riod t on the entire history up to period t. A simple application of well-known
arguments shows that there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to Marko-
vian decisions, where the social planner bases his decision on a state summarizing
the payoff-relevant part of the history.3 In our context, the payoff-relevant part of
the history at any date t ∈ T1 is given by the types of agents present at period t, and
we define a state as a vector of types of the young and old agents, (θy, θo) in Θ×Θ.
3See Putterman (1994) for an introduction to the literature on Markovian decision problems and
the proof that Markovian decision rules are optimal.
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3 Optimal assignment of objects
3.1 Characterization of the optimal assignment
We now characterize the optimal assignment by applying Bellman’s principle of op-
timality to the Markovian decision problem of the benevolent social planner. Define
the value function at a state (θy, θo) by
V (θy, θo) = max
py ,po
py(θy(1 + δ) + δ2
∫ θ
θ
∫ θ
θ
V (ty, to)f(ty)f(to)dtydto)
+poθo + δ(1− py)
∫ θ
θ
V (ty, θy)f(ty)dty. (1)
In the expression above, we distinguish between the two choices of the social
planner: if she allocates the good to the young agent, the young agent keeps it for
two periods, and after two periods, the new state will be characterized by two new
types which have been drawn according to the distribution F . If, on the other hand,
the good is assigned to the old agent, he will keep it only for one period, and in
the next period, the type of the old agent will be known, and given by θot+1 = θ
y
t
while the type of the new agent will be drawn according to F . From expression (1),
we immediately make one observation. As types are assumed to be positive, the
planner’s objective is increasing in po for py fixed, so she will always assign the good
to one of the two agents. We can thus replace po by 1− py. Given this,
V (θy, θo) = max
py
py(θy(1 + δ) + δ2
∫ θ
θ
∫ θ
θ
V (ty, to)f(ty)f(to)dtydto)
+(1− py)(θo + δ
∫ θ
θ
V (ty, θy)f(ty)dty).
The objective is linear in py, so that we obtain a simple characterization of the op-
timal policy: the planner should either assign the good to the young or the old agent
with probability 1, depending on the sign of θy(1+δ)+δ2
∫ θ
θ
∫ θ
θ V (t
y, to)f(ty)f(to)dtydto−
θo − δ ∫ θθ V (ty, θy)f(ty)dty. Next, define the mapping φ from Θ to < by:
φ(θ) ≡ θ(1 + δ)− δ
∫ θ
θ
V (t, θ)f(t)dt+ δ2
∫ θ
θ
∫ θ
θ
V (t, z)f(t)f(z)dtdz.
We label the function φ the selectivity function associated to the optimal planner’s
decision. This terminology is easily understood: the social planner will allocate the
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good to the old agent if and only if θ0 ≥ φ(θy). As the selectivity function fully
characterizes the optimal assignment, we now study the properties of this mapping.
Lemma 1 The function φ is strictly increasing, and satisfies φ(θ) < θ for all θ ∈
[θ, θ), φ(θ) = θ.
Lemma 1 provides a useful characterization of the optimal assignment for any pair
of types (θy, θo). It shows that optimal assignments are characterized by threshold
rules, determining for any θy, the minimal type of the old agent who is preferred
to θy, and for any θo, the minimal type of the young agent who is preferred to θo.
Of course, these optimal threshold rules are not independent (one is the inverse of
the other), and we focus attention on the threshold rule φ(θy), which determines the
minimal type of the old agent preferred to θy. The second part of Lemma 1 captures
the ”option value” of assigning the object to the old agent. If both agents have the
same type, the social planner always prefers to assign the object to the old agent, as
she retains the option value of assigning the object to the young agent next period,
but can also draw a young agent with higher type. This option value explains the
existence of a positive ”gap”, measured by θ−φ(θ), between the minimal type of the
young and old agents. Finally, notice that Lemma 1 holds without any condition on
the differentiability of the selectivity function φ.
Next, observe that, assuming that φ is differentiable, by a simple application of
the envelope theorem, we compute:
∂
∫ θ
θ V (t, θ)f(t)dt
∂θ
= F (φ−1(θ)).
Using this observation, we can easily characterize continuously differentiable selec-
tivity functions as solutions to a functional differential equation:
Theorem 1 There exists an optimal assignment policy characterized by a continu-
ously differentiable selectivity function φ(·) which is the unique solution of the iter-
ative functional differential equation:
φ′(θ) = 1 + δ − δF [φ−1(θ)] (2)
with initial condition φ(θ) = θ.
Theorem 1 characterizes the optimal policy as the solution to an iterative func-
tional differential equation. The iterative functional differential equation (2) belongs
to a class of differential equations which have been studied in physics and mathemat-
ics to analyze dynamical systems with state dependent delays (see Eder (1984), Si
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and Zhang (2004)). Existence and uniqueness of solutions to this functional equation
does not derive from standard theorems on ordinary differential equations, but can
nevertheless be obtained using Banach’s fixed point theorem in functional spaces.
This functional differential equation does not typically admit closed form solutions.4
Inspection of equation (2) provides additional information on the optimal selectivity
function φ:
Corollary 1 The optimal selectivity function φ(·) is strictly concave for any θ ∈
[θ, θ), and φ′(θ) = 1.
Corollary 1 and Lemma 1 show that even though equation (2) does not admit an
analytical solution, the optimal selectivity function possesses remarkable properties.
In addition, equation (2) has a simple recursive structure, which stems from the fact
that, as φ−1(θ) > θ, the value φ′(θ) only depends on the value of the function φ
at points larger than θ. This recursive structure, together with the initial condition
φ(θ) = θ, allows for an efficient algorithm to compute numerical solutions to equa-
tion (2). Using this algorithm, we compute the optimal selectivity function for the
uniform and quadratic distributions over [0, 1].
The first graph shows, for three different values of δ (δ = 0, 0.5 and 1), the
optimal selectivity function φ for the distribution F (θ) = θ over [0, 1]. The second
graph maps the optimal selectivity function φ for the same values of δ and the
distribution F (θ) = θ2 over [0, 1].
4If the distribution F is uniform on [0, 1], the functional differential equation becomes similar to
an equation studied by Si and Zhang (2004) who provide one analytical solution to the equation.
Unfortunately, the solution they propose does not satisfy the boundary condition φ(1) = 1.
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Figure 2: Optimal selectivity function (uniform distribution)
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Figure 3: Optimal selectivity function (quadratic distribution)
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the properties of the selectivity function φ, which is
increasing, concave, crosses the x-axis at a positive value θ∗, and satisfy φ(θ) = θ and
φ′(θ) = 1 for all distributions and all values of the discount factor. The figures also
suggest two comparative statics properties of the selectivity function. From both
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figures, it appears that, as the discount factor δ increases, the selectivity function φ
goes down. Furthermore, a comparison of the two figures indicates that the selec-
tivity function φ is always lower for the quadratic distribution, which stochastically
dominates at the first order the uniform distribution.
3.2 Comparative statics
In this Section, we investigate the two comparative statics properties illustrated by
Figures 2 and 3, and discuss the effect of changes in the discount factor and the
distribution function on the optimal selectivity function of the social planner.
3.2.1 Changes in the discount factor
In order to analyze the effect of changes in the discount factor δ on the optimal
policy, we need to place additional restrictions on the distribution function F . We
define the inverse of the hazard rate of the distribution as:
λ(θ) =
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
.
We assume that the hazard rate of the distribution F is monotonic, so that λ′(θ) < 0
for all θ ∈ Θ. In addition, we will consider a much stronger assumption on the
distribution:
Assumption 1 The distribution F satisfies the following property: λ′(θ) + (1 −
F (θ)) min{1, f(θ)2} < 0 for all θ ∈ Θ.
Assumption 1 puts a bound on the density function f(θ), and typically excludes
distributions for which the density exhibits spikes (like a Dirac distribution). When-
ever the density is monotonically increasing (f ′(θ) ≥ 0 ∀θ), the hazard rate satisfies
λ′(θ) ≤ 1, and Assumption 1 is automatically satisfied. In particular, this Assump-
tion holds for the uniform and quadratic distributions illustrated in Figures 2 and
3.
Proposition 1 For any δ′ > δ, there exists  > 0 such that φ(θ, δ) > φ(θ, δ′) for
any θ ∈ (θ − , θ). If, in addition, the distribution F has a monotone hazard rate
and satisfies Assumption 1, then φ(θ, δ) > φ(θ, δ′) for all θ ∈ Θ.
Proposition 1 comprises two separate statements. First, it shows that the opti-
mal policy is monotonic in δ locally around the upper bound of the support of the
distribution θ. Second, it shows that, under the regularity condition on the distri-
bution F embodied in Assumption 1, the argument can be extended to the entire
support of the distribution.
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Why do we need a regularity condition to prove that φ is decreasing in δ, when
a simple intuition seems to suggest that an increase in δ increases the option value
of assigning the object to the old agent, resulting in a smaller value of φ? A careful
inspection of the functional differential equation (2) helps to understand why this
simple intuition may be flawed. If φ(θ′) for all θ′ > θ is taken to be constant, then
an increase in δ immediately implies an increase in the derivative φ′. Hence, locally
around the upper bound of the distribution, where the value of θ′ > θ is almost
constant, for any δ′ > δ, as φ(θ, δ) = φ(θ, δ′) = θ and φ′(θ, δ′) > φ′(θ, δ), we must
have φ(θ, δ′) < φ(θ, δ). However, for smaller values of θ, this intuition does not
extend: any change in δ affects the entire schedule φ(·) and in particular the value
φ−1(θ). In order to compute the comparative statics of a change in δ on φ, one has
to take into account this additional effect in equation (2), which can only be signed
under additional regularity restrictions on the distribution. In fact, as the following
example illustrates, the optimal policy function may not be monotonically decreasing
in the discount factor when Assumption 1 is violated.
Example 1 Let the distribution F over [0, 1] be given by: F (θ) = θ for θ ∈ (0.995, 1]
and F (θ) = 0.001× θ for θ ∈ [0, 0.995].5 The following figure displays the difference
φ(θ, 0.999)− φ(θ, 0.996).
-1e-07
-8e-08
-6e-08
-4e-08
-2e-08
0
2e-08
0.994 0.995 0.996 0.997 0.998 0.999 1
θ
Figure 4: Difference φ(θ, 0.999)− φ(θ, 0.996)
5This distribution function is discontinuous, but can be approached by a sequence of continuous
distribution functions. Because the problem we are considering is continuous in the distribution F ,
the lack of monotonicity of this example would also hold for a continuous distribution function.
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Figure 4 shows that the selectivity function φ is not monotonic in δ for the
distribution F which spikes at θ = 0.0995. Around the spike, the difference in φ(θ)
becomes positive, contrary to the statement of Proposition 1.
3.2.2 Changes in the distribution
In order to analyze the effect of changes in the distribution on the optimal policy,
we consider a parameterized family of distributions, F (θ, α) defined over the same
support Θ. Distributions with a higher index stochastically dominate at the first
order distributions with a lower index : if α′ > α, F (θ, α′) < F (θ, α) for all θ ∈ (θ, θ).
Assuming that F is differentiable in both its arguments, we thus suppose that ∂F∂α < 0
for θ ∈ (θ, θ), with ∂F∂α = 0 at θ = θ, θ. This last observation shows that the
mapping ∂F∂α is not monotonic. However, we will impose a monotonicity restriction
by considering the mapping:
µ(θ, α) =
∂F (θ,α)
∂α
F (θ, α)
and assuming that the mapping µ is increasing in θ. We also define the likelihood
ration of the distribution F (θ, α) as:
ν(θ, α) =
f(θ, α)
F (θ, α)
.
Assumption 2 The distribution F satisfies the following property: For all α and
all θ, (ln ν(θ, α))′ + ν(θ, α) ≥ (lnµ(θ, α))′.
Assumption 2 places a strong regularity condition on the family of distributions
F (θ, α). It is satisfied for the family F (θ, α) = θα with α ≥ 1 over [0, 1]. For this
family, µ(θ, α) = ln θ and ν(θ) = αθ , and (ln ν(θ))
′ + ν(θ) = α−1θ ≥ 1θ ln θ = (lnµ(θ))′.
Under this Assumption, we establish comparative statics results on the effect of
changes in the distribution which parallel the results obtained for changes in δ.
Proposition 2 For any α′ > α there exists  > 0 such that φ(θ, α′) < φ(θ, α) for all
θ ∈ (θ − , θ). If in addition the family of distributions F (θ, α) is such that µ(θ, α)
is increasing and F satisfies Assumption 2, then φ(θ, α′) < φ(θ, α) for all θ ∈ Θ.
As in the case of changes in the discount factor δ, a simple intuition suggests
that an increase in α increases the option value of the old agent, and should result
in a lower mapping φ. While this intuition is basically correct around the upper end
of the support, it ignores the effect of changes in the distribution on the value of
φ−1(θ) in equation (2). As in the case of the comparative static effects of δ, a strong
regularity condition is needed to prove that φ is monotonically decreasing in α.
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4 Extensions
4.1 Transfers and recovery costs
In the baseline model, we have ruled out monetary transfers between the social
planner and agents, and have assumed that the planner cannot recover the object
from an agent. If the planner was able to recover the object from an old agent
and compensate him with a monetary transfer, she could easily implement the first
best allocation, assigning the object to the young agent if and only if θy ≥ θo. When
transfers are allowed, the only constraints which may prevent the social planner from
reaching first-best efficiency stem from the costs of recovering the object from an old
agent who possesses it. In this section, we consider two specifications for recovery
costs: a fixed cost and a proportional cost of recovery. The fixed cost specification
corresponds to situations where the cost incurred is independent of the agent’s types,
as in the case of moving costs or fixed training costs for specific positions. The
proportional cost formulation captures situations where the cost is proportional to
the type of the old agent, as is the case if the planner must compensate the old agent
with a monetary transfer which cannot immediately be extracted from the young
agent, and faces a positive cost of public funds.
4.1.1 Fixed recovery costs
We assume that the planner has the possibility of reassigning the good held by
the old agent at a cost K. We write down the Markovian decision problem of the
benevolent social planner for two situations: V (θy, θo) denotes the value function at
a state where the good is not assigned and W (θy, θo) the value function at a state
where the good is assigned to the old agent. Straightforward computations show
that:
V (θy, θo) = max
py
py(θy + δ
∫ θ
θ
W (ty, θy)f(ty)dty)
+(1− py)(θo + δ
∫ θ
θ
V (ty, θy)f(ty)dty),
W (θy, θo) = max
qy
(1− qy)(θo + δ
∫ θ
θ
V (ty, θy)f(ty)dty)
+qy(θy −K + δ
∫ θ
θ
W (ty, θy)f(ty)dty).
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The preceding expressions are generalizations of the value function obtained in
the baseline model. If the social planner allocates the good to the young agent, the
young agent keeps it for one period, and the planner is in a state where the good is
assigned to the old agent next period. If, on the other hand, the good is assigned
to the old agent, he will keep it only for one period and the planner is in a state
where the good is not reassigned next period. When the old agent holds the good,
the planner must pay the cost K if she wants to assign it to the young agent. As the
objectives are linear in py and qy, we obtain a simple characterization of the optimal
policy:
• assign the good to the young agent if θy + δ ∫ θθ W (ty, θy)f(ty)dty ≥ θo +
δ
∫ θ
θ V (t
y, θy)f(ty)dty and to the old agent otherwise,
• reassign the good from the old agent to the young if and only if θy − K +
δ
∫ θ
θ W (t
y, θy)f(ty)dty ≥ θo + δ ∫ θθ V (ty, θy)f(ty)dty.
These expressions suggest that the optimal policy will again be characterized by
a pair of selectivity functions, φ(θ) and γ(θ), corresponding to situations where the
good is not assigned, and when the good is assigned to the old agent. Following
the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 1, we can easily show that the two
mappings φ(·) and γ(·) are increasing. Replicating the argument of Theorem 1, we
also obtain a characterization of the optimal selectivity functions as solutions to a
system of iterative functional differential equations.
Proposition 3 When the planner faces a fixed recovery cost, there exists an opti-
mal assignment policy characterized by a pair of continuously differentiable selectivity
function φ(·) and γ(·) which are the unique solutions of the system of iterative func-
tional differential equation:
φ′(θ) = 1 + δF [γ−1(θ)]− δF [φ−1(θ)] (3)
γ′(θ) = 1 + δF [γ−1(θ)]− δF [φ−1(θ)] (4)
with initial conditions φ(θ) = θ and γ(θ) = θ−K and the convention that γ−1(θ) = θ
for all θ ∈ [θ −K, θ].
Proposition 3 shows that our analysis can easily be extended to accommodate
situations where the planner faces a recovery cost. When K = 0, the two mappings
φ and γ coincide, and the selectivity function is characterized by the differential
equations φ(θ) = θ; hence the good is allocated to the agent with the highest type.
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When, on the other hand, θ − θ < K, we have that γ−1(θ) = θ for all θ ∈ [θ, θ], so
that the selectivity function is characterized by the unique equation:
φ′(θ) = 1 + δ − δF (φ−1(θ)),
as in the baseline model.
Using equations (3) and (4), we easily see that φ and γ are both increasing and
concave, that φ′(θ) = γ′(θ) = 1, that φ(θ) < θ and γ(θ) < θ −K.
The following graphs show, for three different values of δ (δ = 0, 0.5 and 1), the
selectivity functions for a uniform distribution and a cost K = 0.5. The mapping
φ(·) is in solid lines, and the mapping γ(·) in dotted lines.
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θ
Figure 5: Optimal selectivity function (fixed recovery cost)
4.1.2 Proportional recovery costs
We now suppose that the good can be recovered from the old agent, but at a cost
κθo which is proportional to the old agent’s surplus. This situation would arise if the
planner were to compensate the old agent and support a cost of public funds.6 With
a proportional recovery cost, the values V (θy, θo) and W (θy, θo) at states where the
good is not assigned and assigned to the old agent can be computed as:
6If the planner can extract a transfer from the young agent to compensate the old, this situation
would still arise if the planner must pay the old agent before receiving the young agent’s transfer.
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V (θy, θo) = max
py
py(θy + δ
∫ θ
θ
W (ty, θy)f(ty)dty)
+(1− py)(θo + δ
∫ θ
θ
V (ty, θy)f(ty)dty),
W (θy, θo) = max
qy
(1− qy)(θo + δ
∫ θ
θ
V (ty, θy)f(ty)dty)
+qy(θy − κθo + δ
∫ θ
θ
W (ty, θy)f(ty)dty).
The optimal policy is thus characterized by the following threshold rules:
• assign the good to the young agent if θy + δ ∫ θθ W (ty, θy)f(ty)dty ≥ θo +
δ
∫ θ
θ V (t
y, θy)f(ty)dty and to the old agent otherwise,
• reassign the good from the old agent to the young if and only if θy+δ ∫ θθ W (ty, θy)f(ty)dty ≥
θo(1 + κ) + δ
∫ θ
θ V (t
y, θy)f(ty)dty.
The optimal selectivity functions are characterized by a system of iterative dif-
ferential equations:
Proposition 4 When the planner faces a proportional recovery cost, there exists
an optimal assignment policy characterized by a pair of continuously differentiable
selectivity function φ(·) and γ(·) which are the unique solutions of the system of
iterative functional differential equation:
φ′(θ) = 1 + δ[(1 + κ)F (γ−1(θ))− F (φ−1(θ))− κ] (5)
γ′(θ) =
1 + δ[(1 + κ)F (γ−1(θ))− F (φ−1(θ))− κ]
1 + κ
(6)
with initial conditions φ(θ) = θ and γ(θ) = θ1+κ and the convention that γ
−1(θ) = θ
for all θ ∈ [ θ1+κ , θ].
The following graphs show, for three different values of δ (δ = 0, 0.5 and 1), the
selectivity functions for a uniform distribution and for a cost κ = 0.5. The mapping
φ(·) is in solid lines, and the mapping γ(·) in dotted lines.
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Figure 6: Optimal selectivity function (proportional recovery cost)
Figure 5 illustrates the difference between fixed and proportional recovery costs.
It also shows an interesting non-monotonicity in the gap between the marginal type
of the old and young agent, θ − φ(θ) with proportional recovery costs. For low
values of θ, the cost of recovering objects becomes negligible, and hence the planner
is willing to give objects to young agents more often, and the selectivity function
is close to the first-best assignment rule, φ(θ) = θ. Similarly, for high values of θ,
as the probability of drawing an agent of type higher than θ becomes low, the gap
θ − φ(θ) becomes small. The higher values of the gap θ − φ(θ) are obtained in the
intermediate range, when the value of the object is neither too high nor too low.
4.2 Private information about agents’ types
We now suppose that the types of the agents are not observable, and characterize
revelation mechanisms which implement the optimal assignment rule. The structure
of the model, where agents enter sequentially and the good may not be reassigned
every period, allows for different timings in the revelation mechanisms. We will
consider both a mechanism where agents pay transfers at the time they enter society,
whether the good is reassigned or not (Mechanism I) and a mechanism where agents
pay transfers at the time that the good is assigned (Mechanism II).
18
4.2.1 Mechanism I.
At any time t, the young agent is asked to reveal her type θy and pays a transfer
mt(θy, θo) which may depend on the type of the old agent at time t. At any time
t ∈ T1, the mechanism designer chooses the probabilities with which the object is
assigned to the young and old agents, pyt (θ
y, θo) and pot (θ
y, θo).
Given this mechanism structure, the utility of an agent of type θ entering at time
t ∈ T1 and announcing θˆ when the old agent is of type θo is given by
U1(θ, θˆ, θo) = θ(1 + δ)p
y
t (θˆ, θ
o) + δ(1− pyt (θˆ, θo))θEθypot+1(θy, θˆ)−mt(θˆ, θo).
The utility of an agent of type θ entering at a time t ∈ T0 and announcing θˆ is
independent of the type of the old agent at period t, and given by
U0(θ, θˆ) = δθEθypot+1(θ
y, θˆ)−mt(θˆ).
We consider the implementation of the optimal assignment rule, given by py(θy, θo) =
1 if θo ≤ φ(θy) and po(θy, θo) = 1 if θo ≥ φ(θy). The following proposition charac-
terizes the transfer rules which implement the efficient assignment.
Proposition 5 The efficient assignment can be implemented by a transfer rule mt
in mechanism 1 if and only if, for t in T1,
mt(θ, θo) =
{
Mt if θo ≤ φ(θ),
δθF (φ−1(θ))− δ ∫ θθ F (φ−1(t))dt−Nt if θo ≥ φ(θ)
where Nt ≥ 0 and Mt +Nt ≤ (1 + δ)φ−1(θo)− δ
∫ φ−1(θo)
θ F (φ
−1(t))dt.
And, for t ∈ T0,
mt(θ) = δθF (φ−1(θ))− δ
∫ θ
θ
F (φ−1(t))dt−Nt,
for Nt ≥ 0.
Proposition 5 shows that the efficient assignment can be implemented by a sta-
tionary transfer rule, which only depends on whether the object is assigned at period
t or not. For θ ≥ φ−1(θo),the efficient rule assigns the good to the young agent ir-
respective of the value θ. Hence, the transfer must be independent of θ.7 For lower
values of θ, (and in periods where the good is not reassigned), the agent receives the
7This is of course a variant of the classical result on the implementation of efficient auction rules
and efficient public decisions using Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms.
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good if and only if the young agent drawn next period has a type lower than φ−1(θ).
Hence, the assignment probability of the good to the agent is strictly increasing in
θ, implying that the transfer is strictly increasing in the announcement θ.
If we suppose furthermore that the planner incurs a cost of public funds, and
wants to minimize her deficit, then Nt = 0 and the fixed payment paid by high type
agents when the good is assigned is given by:
M = (1 + δ)φ−1(θo)− δ
∫ φ−1(θo)
θ
F (φ−1(t))dt.
4.2.2 Mechanism II.
We now suppose that transfers are paid at the time that the good is assigned. Two
situations may arise. If t − 1 ∈ T1, then the type of the old agent was revealed in
the previous period. In that case, the planner will only set a transfer for the young
agent, and the transfer may depend on the type of the old agent, mt(θy, θo). If, on
the other hand, t − 1 ∈ T0, then the planner must make both agents reveal their
types, and she will choose two transfer rules myt (θ
y, θo) and mot (θ
y, θo) for the young
and old agent, respectively.
The utility of the young agent at a period t following a period t− 1 in T1 when
his type is θ and he announces θˆ is given by:
U1(θ, θˆ, θo) = θ(1 + δ)p
y
t (θˆ, θ
o) + δ(1− pyt (θˆ, θo))θEθypot+1(θy, θˆ)−mt(θˆ, θo).
as in the case of young agents at periods t ∈ T1 in mechanism I. The expected utility
of a young and old agent when the previous period was in T0 is given by:
EUy0 = θ(1 + δ)F (φ(θˆ)) + δθ(1− F (φ(θˆ))F (φ−1(θˆ))−
∫ θ
θ
myt (θ, θ
o)f(θo)dθo,
EUo0 = θF (φ
−1(θˆ))−
∫ θ
θ
mot (θ
y, θ)f(θy)dθy,
leading to the following characterization of the optimal revelation mechanisms:
Proposition 6 The efficient assignment can be implemented by a transfer rule mt
in mechanism II if and only if, for any period t such that t− 1 ∈ T1,
mt(θ, θo) =
{
Mt if θo ≤ φ(θ),
δθF (φ−1(θ))− δ ∫ θθ F (φ−1(t))dt−Nt if θo ≥ φ(θ)
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where Nt ≥ 0 and Mt +Nt ≤ (1 + δ)φ−1(θo)− δ
∫ φ−1(θo)
θ F (φ
−1(t))dt.
And for any period such that t− 1 ∈ T0,
∫ θ
θ
myt (θ, θ
o)f(θo)dθo = θ(1 + δ)F (φ(θ)) + δθ(1− F (φ(θ))F (φ−1(θ))
+
∫ θ
θ
(1 + δ)F (φ(t)) + δ(1− F (φ(t))F (φ−1(t))dt
−Nt,∫ θ
θ
mot (θ
y, θ)f(θy)dθy = δθF (φ−1(θ))− δ
∫ θ
θ
F (φ−1(t))dt
− Nt
where Nt ≥ 0.
The efficient revelation mechanism in Model II differs from the mechanism in
Model I because of difference in the information of the agents. In Model II, when
both types are unknown, the planner uses a Bayesian mechanism to simultaneously
obtain information about the types of the old and young agent. In that Bayesian
mechanism, the expected utilities of the agents are strictly increasing in their types,
so that the expected transfer rules are also strictly increasing in agents’ types. By
contrast, when the type of the old agent is known and the planner only needs to
extract information about the type of the young agent, as in the efficient mechanism
in Model I, the planner uses a flat transfer rule for high type agents.
4.3 Investment for type improvement
In this last extension, we allow agents to invest in order to improve their types. We
consider the following timing. At the beginning of period t, before the type of the
young agent is drawn, the old agent has access to a technology which increases his
type from θ to θ′ at a cost c(θ′ − θ). We assume that young agents cannot improve
their types. 8We let c(·) be a strictly increasing, convex function satisfying c(0) = 0
and c(∆) = 1 for some ∆ > 0. We distinguish between the investment of an old
agent who does not hold the good and of an old agent who holds the good and denote
the agents’ types after investment as ζ and η in these two respective situations.
We characterize the planner’s optimal choices when she has access to three con-
trols: the probability py(θy, θ), of assigning the good to the young agent, and the
target type values of the old agent, ζ(θo) and η(θo), in periods where the good is not
8Letting the agents invest before the good is assigned at their young age would greatly complicate
the analysis without yielding additional insights.
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assigned and in periods where the good is assigned respectively. We compute the
expected values of the social planner before the type of the young agent is drawn in
the cases where the old agent does not hold the good and holds the good as:
EV (θo) = max
ζ
−c(ζ − θo) +
∫ θ
θ
max
py
(py(θy + δEW (θy)
+(1− py)(ζ + δEV (θy))f(θy)dθy,
EW (θo) = max
η
η − c(η − θo) +
∫ θ
θ
δEV (θy)f(θy)dθy.
By a standard argument, we observe that the optimal assignment policy at any
state (θy, θ) is to assign the good to the old agent whenever θ ≥ θy + δ(EW (θy) −
EV (θy)). Furthermore, the optimal investment choices are determined by the first
order conditions: c′(η − θo) = 1 and c′(ζ − θo) = ∫ θθ py(θy, ζ). In particular, this
shows that η ≥ ζ, so that an old agent who holds the good (and is sure to keep it
next period) will invest more than an old agent who does not hold the good (and
may not hold it next period). Furthermore, the optimal investment strategy of an
old agent who holds the good is simply given by: η = θ + ∆ for all θ.
When the planner faces an old and young agent of type θ, she is indifferent
between giving the object to the old or young agent, as she will be collecting θ at
period t and θ+∆−c(∆) at period t+1 in both cases. This observation shows that,
as in the baseline case, we obtain a simple boundary condition on the selectivity
function φ(θ) = θ.
Finally, we differentiate EV and EW and use the envelope Theorem to obtain:
∂EV
∂θ
= c′(ζ − θo) =
∫ θ
θ
py(θy, ζ),
∂EW
∂θ
= c′(η − θo) = 1
and characterize the optimal assignment and investment strategies in the following
Proposition:
Proposition 7 When the agents can invest to improve their types, the optimal as-
signment and investment strategies, are characterized by a system of functional dif-
ferential equations:
φ′(θ) = 1 + δ[1− F (φ−1(ζ(θ)))],
c′(ζ(θ)− θ) = F (φ−1(ζ(θ))),
c′(η(θ)− θ) = 1
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with the initial conditions η(θ) = ζ(θ) = θ + ∆, φ(θ) = θ.
Proposition 7 shows that the optimal assignment and investment strategies of
the social planner are interdependent, and result from the simultaneous resolution
of functional equations determining the selectivity function φ and the investment
strategy ζ. For agents who already hold the object, the optimal investment policy
is simply given by η = θ + ∆. If ∆ < θ − θ, an agent of type θ will never invest
to the point where he obtains the good with probability one. In that case, agents
of low type, who may not obtain the good next period, invest less than agents who
currently hold the good or agents of higher type who are guaranteed to hold the
good next period.
Figure 7 illustrates how the optimal investment strategy ζ depends on an agent’s
type. The graph was obtained for a uniform distribution F (θ) = θ and a quadratic
cost function, c(∆θ) = ∆θ2. The three lines correspond to three values of the
discount factor, δ = 0, 0.5, 1, where the higher line corresponds to the lower discount
factor. With this specification, ∆ = 1, and we observe that there is a value θ ∼ 0.5
such that all agents invest in order to improve their types to θo+1 when θo ≥ θ. For
lower values of θo, agents are not guaranteed to hold the good next period, and the
optimal investment strategy of the social planner is to invest less, so that ζ(θo) <
θo + 1. In particular, we observe that there exists a point of non-differentiability of
the investment strategy at θ, with a left-hand derivative smaller than the right-hand
derivative at this point.
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Figure 7: Optimal investment strategy
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5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the assignment of durable objects to successive generations of
agents who live for two periods. Typical examples of durable objects are positions in
organizations, offices, dormitory rooms or durable equipment like rental cars or large
scale scientific equipment. We characterize the optimal assignment by a selectivity
function which satisfies an iterative functional differential equation. We show that
more patient social planners are more selective, as are social planners facing distribu-
tions of types with higher probabilities for higher types. We also investigate optimal
assignment rules when agents can return the object at a cost, when the value of the
object is private information, and when agents can invest to improve the match. In
all these cases, we characterize the optimal assignment policy as a variation on the
baseline selectivity function.
We are aware of several shortcomings of our analysis. First, because we limit
attention to agents with a two-period lifetime, the trade-off between age and value
reduces to a dichotomic choice between old and young agents. Increasing the agents’
lifetime would allow us to obtain a finer characterization of the trade-off, but at
the expense of a considerable increase the complexity of the model. Second, we
suppose that agents enter and exit society through a simple deterministic process.
In reality, agents enter and exit society through a stochastic birth and death process
(possibly with memory, as older agents are more likely to die). Analyzing a model
of assignment of durable goods with stochastic entry and exit is a challenging task
on which we hope to make some progress in the future. Finally, we have limited
our study of revelation mechanisms to efficient mechanisms. In some applications,
like rental cars or hotel rooms, the planner may want to extract information about
agents’ values in order to maximize revenues rather than social surplus. The study of
revenue-maximizing mechanisms for durable goods is a high priority on our research
agenda.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Let h(θ) =
∫ θ
θ V (t, θ)f(t)dt denote the expected value of the
problem when the old agent is of type θ. Let H =
∫ θ
θ h(θ)f(θ)dt denote the expected
value of h. We will show that for any θ < θ′, h(θ)− h(θ′) < θ − θ′.
By definition of φ, the good will be assigned to the old agent of type θ at period t+1
if and only if the type of the young agent drawn next period is below φ(θ). Hence
h(θ) =
∫
t|φ(t)≥θ
[t(1 + δ) + δ2H]f(t)dt+
∫
t|φ(t)≤θ
[θ + δh(t)]f(t)dt.
so that
h(θ′)− h(θ) =
∫
t|θ≤φ(t)≤θ′
[t(1 + δ) + δ2H − δh(t)]f(t)dt+
∫
t|φ(t)≤θ′
θ′f(t)dt−
∫
t|φ(t)≤θ
θf(t)dt,
= −
∫
t|θ≤φ(t)≤θ′
φ(t)f(t)dt+
∫
t|φ(t)≤θ′
θ′f(t)dt−
∫
t|φ(t)≤θ
θf(t)dt,
≤ −
∫
t|θ≤φ(t)≤θ′
θf(t)dt+
∫
t|φ(t)≤θ′
θ′f(t)dt−
∫
t|φ(t)≤θ
θf(t)dt,
= (θ′ − θ)
∫
t|φ(t)≤θ′
f(t)dt,
≤ θ′ − θ.
For any θ < θ′, as h(θ)− h(θ′) < θ − θ′, φ(θ) < φ(θ′), showing that φ is increasing.
To prove the second statement, notice that the planner could always choose to
assign the good to the old agent at period t+ 1, so that
h(θ) ≥ θ + δH.
The inequality shows that φ(θ) ≤ θ. This inequality will be strict for all θ < θ,
as there is always a positive probability to draw a young agent in (θ, θ] which would
give a higher surplus to the planner. As h(θ) = θ + δH, we obtain φ(θ) = θ, as
claimed in the statement of the Lemma.
Proof of Theorem 1: First note that if φ(θ) is differentiable, h(θ) ≡ ∫ θθ V (t, θ)f(t)dt
is also differentiable, and we can compute:
h′(θ) =
∫
t≤φ−1(θ)
f(t)dt = F (φ−1(θ)).
Differentiating φ(·), we obtain:
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φ′(θ) = 1 + δ − δF (φ−1(θ)).
Finally, we prove the existence and uniqueness of a differentiable function satis-
fying equation (2) in an open ball around θ ∈ (θ, θ). To this end, we will consider a
change of variable, and define the inverse function of φ as χ = φ−1.
The differential equation (2) now becomes:
χ′(θ) =
1
1 + δ(1− F (χ ◦ χ)(θ)) .
Finally, we prove the existence and uniqueness of a differentiable function satisfy-
ing equation (2) in an open ball around θ ∈ (θ, θ). To this end, let χ(θ) ≡ θˆ be fixed,
and consider the set C of bounded real-valued continuous functions over the open ball
B(θ) satisfying the following two conditions: χ(θ) = θˆ and |χ(t1)−χ(t2)| < |t1− t2|
for all (t1, t2) ∈ B(θ). Clearly, C is a closed subset of the complete metric space
of bounded real-valued continuous functions, equipped with the sup norm, ||χ|| =
supt∈B(θ)|χ(t)|.
Next, consider the following operator T on C,
Tχ(t) = θˆ +
∫ t
θ
1
1 + δ − δF [(χ ◦ χ)(z)]dz.
We first show that T maps C onto itself. Clearly, Tχ(θ) = θˆ. Furthermore, for
any t1, t2 ∈ B(θ),
|Tχ(t1)− Tχ(t2)| = |
∫ t2
t1
1
1 + δ − δF [(χ ◦ χ)(z)]dz|,
< |t1 − t2|,
where the last inequality is obtained because 11+δ−δF [(χ◦χ)(z)] < 1. Next we show
that T is a contracting operator. For any t,
|Tχ(t)− Tχ′(t)| = |
∫ t
θ
1
1 + δ − δF [(χ ◦ χ)(z)] −
1
1 + δ − δF [(χ′ ◦ χ′)(z)]dz,
= |
∫ t
θ
δ(F (χ′ ◦ χ′)(z)− F (χ ◦ χ)(z))dz
(1 + δ − δF [(χ ◦ χ)(z)])(1 + δ − δF [(χ′ ◦ χ′)(z)]) |
< |
∫ t
θ
δ(F (χ′ ◦ χ′)(z)− F (χ ◦ χ)(z))dz|
≤ δ|
∫ t
θ
(χ′ ◦ χ′)(z)− (χ ◦ χ)(z))dz|
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where the first inequality is due to the fact that 11+δ−δF [(χ◦χ)(z)] < 1 and the second
to the fact that the distribution function F is differentiable and hence Lipschitz
continuous. Now,
|(χ′ ◦ χ′)(z)− (χ ◦ χ)(z))| ≤ |(χ′ ◦ χ′)(z)− (χ ◦ χ′)(z))|+ |(χ ◦ χ′)(z)− (χ ◦ χ)(z)|,
≤ |χ′(χ′(z))− χ(χ′(z))|+ |χ′(z)− χ(z)|
where the last inequality is due to the fact that χ is Lipschitz continuous. Integrating
over z, we find that
|Tχ(t)− Tχ′(t)| < 2(t− θ) sup
τ∈B(θ)
|χ′(τ)− χ(τ)|,
≤ 2||χ− χ′||,
so that T is a contracting operator. By Banach’s fixed point theorem, the operator
admits a unique fixed point χ which satisfies χ(θ) = θˆ and χ′(θ) = 11+δ−δF [(χ◦χ)(θ)] .
Proof of Proposition 1: We recall that:
∂φ(θ, δ)
∂θ
= 1 + δ − δF (φ−1(θ)).
Differentiating again with respect to δ:
∂2φ(θ, δ)
∂θ∂δ
= 1− F (φ−1(θ, δ))− δf(φ−1(θ, δ))∂φ
−1(θ, δ)
∂δ
. (7)
Notice that ∂
2φ(θ,δ)
∂θ∂δ = 1 − F (φ−1(θ, δ) = ∂φ
−1(θ,δ)
∂δ = 0. We differentiate once more
with respect to θ:
∂3φ(θ, δ)
∂θ2∂δ
= −f(φ−1(θ, δ)∂φ
−1(θ, δ)
∂θ
− δf ′(φ−1(θ, δ))∂φ
−1(θ, δ)
∂θ
∂φ−1(θ, δ)
∂δ
− δf(φ−1(θ, δ))∂
2φ−1(θ, δ)
∂θ∂δ
.
Evaluating this derivative at θ and using the fact that ∂φ
−1(θ,δ)
∂δ =
∂2φ−1(θ,δ)
∂θ∂δ = 0 and
∂φ−1(θ,δ)
∂θ > 0, we conclude that:
∂3φ(θ, δ)
∂θ2∂δ
< 0.
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By continuity, there exists an open interval (θ − , θ) such that ∂3φ(θ,δ)
∂θ2∂δ
< 0 for all
θ ∈ (θ − , θ). But as ∂2φ(θ,δ)∂θ∂δ = 0, this implies that ∂
2φ(θ,δ)
∂θ∂δ > 0 for all θ ∈ (θ − , θ)
and, as ∂φ(θ,δ)∂δ = 0, that
∂φ(θ,δ)
∂δ < 0 for all θ ∈ (θ − , θ).
We want to show that ∂φ(θ,δ)∂δ < 0 for all δ and all θ ∈ [θ, θ). To this end, we will prove
the (stronger) statement that ∂
2φ(θ,δ)
∂θ∂δ > 0 for all δ and all θ. Fix some δ > 0 and
suppose by contradiction that there exists θ˜ such that ∂
2φ(θ,δ)
∂θ∂δ > 0 for all θ ∈ (θ˜, θ)
but ∂
2φ(θ˜,δ)
∂θ∂δ = 0. Let
ψ(θ, δ) ≡ 1
f(φ−1(θ, δ)
∂2φ(θ, δ)
∂θ∂δ
= λ(φ−1(θ, δ))− δ ∂φ
−1(θ, δ)
∂δ
,
Because f(φ−1(θ, δ)) > 0 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ], we have:
∂2φ(θ, δ)
∂θ∂δ
> 0 ⇔ ψ(θ) > 0,
∂2φ(θ, δ)
∂θ∂δ
= 0 ⇔ ψ(θ) = 0.
In particular, we know that ψ(θ˜) = ψ(θ) = 0 and ψ(θ˜) > 0 for all θ ∈ (θ˜, θ). Next,
note that
∂φ−1(θ, δ)
∂θ
=
1
∂φ(φ−1(θ,δ),δ)
∂θ
so that
∂2φ−1(θ, δ)
∂θ∂δ
= −
∂2φ(φ−1(θ,δ),δ)
∂θ∂δ +
∂2φ(φ−1(θ,δ),δ)
∂θ2
∂φ−1(θδ)
∂δ
(∂φ(φ
−1(θ,δ)
∂θ )
2
.
Notice that, for all θ ∈ [θ, θ), ∂2φ(θ,δ)
∂θ2
< 0 and ∂φ
−1(θ˜,δ)
∂δ =
λ(φ−1(θ˜,δ))
δ > 0. Hence,
−∂
2φ−1(θ, δ)
∂θ∂δ
< (
∂φ−1(θ, δ)
∂θ
)2
∂2φ(φ−1(θ, δ), δ)
∂θ∂δ
.
Next, note that as φ−1(θ, δ) > θ, φ−1(θ, δ) > θ˜ and hence ∂φ
−1(φ−1(θ,δ),δ)
∂δ > 0. This
implies that
∂2φ(φ−1(θ, δ), δ)
∂θ∂δ
< 1− F (φ−1(φ−1(θ, δ), δ) < 1− F (φ−1(θ, δ)), (8)
where the first inequality stems from equation (7) and the second from the fact that
F is increasing. Furthermore, using equation (7), we compute:
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δf(φ−1(θ˜, δ))
∂φ−1(θ˜, δ)
∂δ
= 1− F (φ−1(θ˜, δ)). (9)
Using equations (8) and (9), we obtain:
∂3φ(θ˜, δ)
∂θ2∂δ
< −f(φ−1(θ˜, δ))∂φ
−1(θ˜, δ)
∂θ
− f
′(φ−1(θ˜, δ))(1− F (φ−1(θ˜, δ)))
f(φ−1(θ˜, δ))
∂φ−1(θ˜, δ)
∂θ
+ δf(φ−1(θ˜, δ))(1− F (φ−1(θ˜, δ)))(∂φ
−1(θ˜, δ)
∂θ
)2.
Next, using the fact that 0 < δ < 1, 0 < ∂φ
−1(θ,δ)
∂θ < 1 and 0 < f(θ), we have:
∂3φ(θ˜, δ)
∂θ2∂δ
<
1
f(φ−1(θ˜, δ)
(λ′(φ−1(θ˜, δ)) + f2(φ−1(θ˜, δ))(1− F (φ−1(θ˜, δ)))). (10)
By a similar argument, we compute:
∂ψ(θ˜, δ)
∂θ
< λ′(φ−1((˜θ), δ)) + 1− F (φ−1(θ˜, δ)). (11)
Using Assumption 1, we have that λ′(θ) + (1−F (θ)) min{1, f(θ)2} < 0 for all θ.
This implies that either ∂
3φ(θ˜,δ)
∂θ2∂δ
< 0 or ∂ψ(θ˜,δ)∂θ < 0. But hence, we either contradict
the fact that ∂
2φ(θ˜,δ)
∂θ∂δ = 0 or the fact that ψ(θ˜, δ) = 0. This argument thus shows
that, for all θ ∈ [θ∗(δ), θ), ∂2φ(θ,δ)∂θ∂δ > 0 and hence ∂φ(θ,δ)∂δ < 0, concluding the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2: We compute
∂2φ(θ, α)
∂θ∂α
= −δ ∂F (φ
−1(θ, α)
∂α
− δf(φ−1(θ, α))∂φ
−1(θ, α)
∂α
. (12)
Note that ∂
2φ(θ,α)
∂θ∂α =
∂F (φ−1(θ,α))
∂α =
∂φ−1(θ,α)
∂α = 0. Differentiating once more with
respect to θ:
∂3φ(θ, α)
∂θ2∂α
= −δ ∂f(φ
−1(θ, α))
∂α
∂φ−1(θ, α)
∂θ
−δf ′(φ−1(θ, α))∂φ
−1(θ, α)
∂θ
∂φ−1(θ, α)
∂α
−δf(φ−1(θ, α))∂
2φ−1(θ, α)
∂θ∂α
.
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We note that ∂F (θ,α)∂α = 0 and
∂F (θ,α)
∂α < 0 for θ ∈ (θ, θ). This implies that
∂f(φ−1(θ,α))
∂α > 0. Hence, we observe that
∂3φ(θ, α)
∂θ2∂α
< 0.
In turn, this implies that there exists an open interval (θ − , θ) such that, for all
θ ∈ (θ − , θ), ∂3φ(θ,α)
∂θ2∂α
< 0, ∂
2φ(θ,α)
∂φ∂α > 0 and
∂φ(θ,α)
∂α < 0.
We aim to show that for all α and θ ∈ [θ, θ), ∂φ(θ,α)∂α < 0. To this end, we will prove
the stronger statement that ∂
2φ(θ,α)
∂φ∂α > 0 for all α, θ. Suppose by contradiction, that
there exists α and θ˜ such that such that ∂
2φ(θ,α)
∂φ∂α > 0 for all θ > θ˜ and
∂2φ(θ˜,α)
∂φ∂α = 0.
Define the mapping
ξ(θ, α) ≡ 1
δF (φ−1(θ, α))
∂2φ(θ, α)
∂φ∂α
= −µ(φ−1(θ, α))− ν(φ−1(θ, α))∂φ
−1(θ, α)
∂α
.
Because δ, F (φ−1(θ, α)) > 0, we know that
ξ(θ, α) = 0 ⇔ ∂
2φ(θ, α)
∂φ∂α
= 0,
ξ(θ, α) > 0 ⇔ ∂
2φ(θ, α)
∂φ∂α
> 0.
In particular, this shows that ξ(θ, α) > 0 for all θ ∈ (θ˜, θ) and ξ(θ˜, α) = 0. Now
compute
∂ξ(θ, α)
∂θ
= −µ′(φ−1(θ, α))∂φ
−1(θ, α)
∂θ
−ν ′(φ−1(θ, α))∂φ
−1(θ, α)
∂θ
∂φ−1(θ, α)
∂α
−ν(φ−1(θ, α))∂
2φ−1(θ, α)
∂θ∂α
.
Now, note that, by definition of θ˜,
∂φ−1(θ˜, α)
∂α
=
∂F (φ−1(θ˜,α))
∂α
f(φ−1(θ˜, α))
=
µ(φ−1(θ, α)
ν(φ−1(θ, α))
.
Furthermore,
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∂2φ−1(θ, α)
∂θ∂α
= −(∂φ
−1(θ, α)
∂θ
)2(
∂2φ(φ−1(θ, α), α)
∂θ∂α
− ∂
2φ(φ−1(θ, α), α)
∂θ2
∂φ−1(θ, α)
∂α
).
Because ∂
2φ(φ−1(θ˜,α),α)
∂θ2
< 0 and ∂φ
−1(θ˜,α)
∂α > 0, we have:
−∂
2φ−1(θ˜, α)
∂θ∂α
< (
∂φ−1(θ˜, α)
∂θ
)2
∂2φ(φ−1(θ˜, α), α)
∂θ∂α
. (13)
Furthermore, because φ−1(θ˜) > θ˜,
∂2φ(φ−1(θ˜, α), α)
∂θ∂α
< −δ ∂F (φ
−1(φ−1(θ˜, α), α))
∂α
,
< −∂F (φ
−1(φ−1(θ˜, α), α))
∂α
.
Using the previous inequality and inequality (13),
∂2φ(φ−1(θ˜, α), α)
∂θ∂α
<
∂2φ(φ−1(θ˜,α),α)
∂θ∂α
F ((φ−1(φ−1(θ˜, α), α))
,
< −
∂F (φ−1(φ−1(θ˜,α),α))
∂α
F ((φ−1(φ−1(θ˜, α), α))
,
= −µ(φ−1(φ−1(θ˜, α), α)),
< −µ(φ−1(θ˜, α)).
where the first inequality comes from the fact that F ((φ−1(φ−1(θ˜, α), α))) < 1 and
the last from the fact that µ(θ) is increasing.
Combining these inequalities, we get:
∂ξ(θ˜, α)
∂θ
< −µ′(φ−1(θ˜, α))− ν ′(φ−1(θ˜, α))µ(φ
−1(θ˜, α))
ν(φ−1(θ˜, α))
− ν(φ−1(θ˜, α))µ(φ−1(θ˜, α)).
Using assumption 2, we conclude that ∂ξ(θ˜,α)∂θ < 0, contradicting the fact that
ξ(θ˜, α) = 0 and ξ(θ, α) > 0 for all θ > θ˜.
Proof of Proposition 3: Omitted.
Proof of Proposition 4: Omitted.
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Proof of Proposition 5: Because the efficient assignment is stationary, we will
consider stationary transfer rules, which only depend on whether the good is reas-
signed or not at period t and let m1 and m0 denote the transfer rules for t ∈ T1 and
t ∈ T0. Consider a period t ∈ T1. Given the efficient assignment, the utility of an
agent is given by:
U1(θ, θˆ, θo) =
{
θ(1 + δ)−m1(θˆ, θo) if θˆ ≥ φ−1(θo),
δθF (φ−1(θˆ))−m1(θˆ, θo) if θˆ ≤ φ−1(θo)
Hence, it is clear that, for θ ≥ φ−1(θo), the transfer rule must be constant, and
m1(θ, θo) = M. Using standard arguments, for θ ≤ φ−1(θo),
∂U1
∂θ
= δF (φ−1(θ)),
so that
U = U(θ) + δ
∫ θ
θ
F (φ−1(t))dt.
Letting N = U(θ), we obtain:
m1 = δθF (φ−1(θ))−
∫ θ
θ
F (φ−1(t))dt−N.
Finally, we need to guarantee that an agent of type θ = φ−1(θo) does not have an
incentive to announce θ < φ−1(θo). This will be true as long as:
φ−1(θo)(1 + δ)−M ≥ δ
∫ φ−1(θo)
θ
F (φ−1(t))dt+N.
For t ∈ T0, we have
U0(θ, θˆ) = δθF (φ−1(θˆ))−m0(θˆ).
We simply compute the transfer m0 as:
m0 = δθF (φ−1(θ))−
∫ θ
θ
F (φ−1(t))dt−N.
Proof of Proposition 6: For periods t following a period t − 1 ∈ T1, when the
type of the old agent is known, the mechanism is the same as that of Proposition 5
and the same argument applies.
For periods such that neither type is known, we simply note that
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∂EUy0
∂θ
= (1 + δ)F (φ(θ)) + δ(1− F (φ(θ))F (φ−1(θ)),
and that
EUy0 (θ) =
∫ θ
θ
∂EUy0
∂θ
dt+ EUy0 (θ),
=
∫ θ
θ
(1 + δ)F (φ(t)) + δ(1− F (φ(t))F (φ−1(t))dt−M,
to get the desired transfer, and use the same argument to compute the expected
transfer of the old agent, noticing that
∂EUo0
∂θ
= F (φ−1(θ)).
Proof of Proposition 7: Because the planner can always choose to assign the
good to the old agent, we necessarily have EV (θo) ≥ EW (θo). This implies that
φ(θy) < θy, so that the planners always prefers to assign the good to the old agent
when θo = θy. We conclude that no agent will ever have an incentive to invest
beyond θ+∆ and any agent of type θ chooses to invest up to θ+∆ whether he holds
the good or not, namely η(θ) = ζ(θ) = θ + ∆. This in turn implies that φ(θ) = θ
as the social planner is indifferent between giving the object to a young or old agent
of type θ. Assuming that the optimal policy is differentiable, we compute ∂EV∂θ and
∂EW
∂θ and observe that φ
′(θ) > 0, showing that the optimal policy of the planner is
an increasing selectivity function. The remainder of the proof follows from standard
arguments.
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